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Diﬀerential Mortality and the
Value of Individual Account
Retirement Annuities
Jeﬀrey R. Brown
Numerous proposals have emerged for supplementing or partially replac-
ing the current U.S. Social Security system with a system of individual
savings accounts. These accounts are similar to deﬁned contribution pen-
sion plans, in that each individual contributes a fraction of annual earnings
so that, upon reaching retirement, the individual then has a potentially
large stock of wealth from which to ﬁnance consumption in the remaining
yearso flife. Under such a system, a retired individual faces the problem
of choosing a consumption path ﬁnanced by the assets accumulated in the
individual account without incurring too great a risk of outliving available
resources. One way to avoid this risk is to purchase a life annuity contract,
whichp romises a stream of income for as long as the policyholder is alive.
This paper examines the distributional implications of alternative annu-
ityo ptions within a mandatory retirement savings system. Distributional
considerations arise from heterogeneity in mortality risk across the popu-
lation, as life annuities are structured to transfer unused resources of early
decedents to longer-lived individuals. For purposes of this paper, transfers
from shorter-lived to longer-lived individuals should not, in and of them-
selves, be considered “redistribution.” If everyone experienced the same
risk of dying at each age, then every individual would have an equal chance
of being the survivor, and thus an annuity would not redistribute in expec-
401tation. Rather, the ex post transfers that would occur would simply be
carrying out the very function of an annuity market.
This paper focuses on the redistribution that arises from diﬀerences in
the expected transfers between particular demographic groups in an indi-
vidual accounts system as a result of mortality diﬀerences. Heterogeneity
in mortality means that annuities that ignore individual or group charac-
teristics will result in expected transfers away from high-mortality risk
groups to low-mortality risk groups. The groups considered in this paper
are diﬀerentiated by gender, race, Hispanic status, and level of education.
Mortality rates diﬀer substantially across these groups, leading to very
diﬀerent valuations of annuities. Calculations suggest that the size of the
expected transfers is quite sensitive to the speciﬁc design of the annuity
program.
The extento fr e distribution depends on how both the accumulation
phase and the payout phase are designed. In the accumulation phase, the
keyq uestion is whether or not to allow preretirement bequests. The proba-
bility of a present twenty-two-year old’s dying prior to retirement age and
thus leaving a bequest were one permitted is very high for certain demo-
graphic groups. For example, while 20 percent of all men who are twenty-
two years old in the year 2000 will die prior to reaching age sixty-seven,
this probability is as high as 41.2 percent for black males with less than a
high school education, and as low as 13.1 percent for college-educated
white males. Therefore, even though lifetime earnings will be much lower
forp oorly educated black males, the expected discounted value of be-
quests for this group is 56 percent larger than it is for college-educated
white males.
Assuming an individual survives to retirement age, there are numerous
dimensions along which the payout phase can be designed, including the
structure of the payment trajectory, the number of lives covered, and
the survivor and bequest options that are included. Results indicate that
the degree of redistribution that occurs within an individual accounts
system is quite sensitive to the speciﬁc structure of this payout phase.
Mandating the use of a single life, inﬂation-indexed annuity leads to very
substantial transfers from men to women, from blacks to whites and
Hispanics, and from lower education groups to higher ones. The size of
these expected transfers can be signiﬁcantly reduced through the use of
joint and survivor annuities, period-certain or refund options, or “front-
loading” in annuity payments. However, the mechanisms that lessen the
extento fr e distribution often do so at the expense of insurance provision,
because the way to reduce the impact of mortality diﬀerentials is to lessen
the importance of mortality in the calculation of beneﬁts. Period-certain
and refund options do this, but at the expense of providing a lower level
of monthly income. In the extreme, one could completely eliminate redis-
tribution by forgoing annuitization entirely. However, to do so would be to
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forgo the potentially large welfare gains that arise from access to annuiti-
zation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 10.1 examines the impact
of gender, race, and socioeconomic status on mortality risk. The relevant
literature on diﬀerential mortality is reviewed, and then new estimates are
presented that use the National Longitudinal Mortality Study. Section
10.2 discusses the accumulation phase of an annuity, with particular focus
on howd i ﬀerential mortality aﬀects the decision of whether to allow for
preretirement bequests. Section 10.3 examines the “money’s worth” of an-
nuities for each demographic group under several diﬀerent assumptions
abouth ow the payout phase is designed, including real annuities, nominal
annuities, period-certain options, joint life products, and refund options.
It also discusses implications for variable annuity design, as well as the
impact of partial or delayed annuitization. Section 10.4 provides a brief
discussion of how the results change if we loosen the constraint that all
individuals face the same price. Section 10.5 concludes.
10.1 Mortality Diﬀerentials by Gender, Race, and Economic Status
10.1.1 Previous Literature on Diﬀerential Mortality
At least since the inﬂuential study by Kitagawa and Hauser (1973), it
has been known that mortality diﬀers across socioeconomic groups in the
United States. In addition to documenting the signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
mortality across racial lines, Kitagawa and Hauser found diﬀerences along
educational and income margins. One of their most-cited ﬁndings is that
mortality varied inversely with the level of educational attainment. They
found that for those aged twenty-ﬁve to sixty-four, this inverse and mono-
tonic relationship between years of schooling and mortality existed for all
race and sex classes.
In the years following this study, the literature on diﬀerential mortality
has grown rapidly, and consequently I will not attempt to provide a com-
prehensive review of this literature.1 Rather, I focus on what the literature
has found with respect to the four factors—gender, race, ethnicity and
measures of economic status—that form the basis for the analysis that
follows.
Gender
It is well known that mortality rates of females are lower than those of
males. This diﬀerential exists at all ages in the United States, leading to
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in life expectancy for men and women. The cohort
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life expectancy at birth (in 1978) of 75.5 years for males and 82.1 years
for females. To account for these diﬀerences in the analysis that follows,
estimation of mortality rates will be performed separately for males and
females.
Race and Hispanic Status
Racial and ethnic diﬀerences in mortality also exist, although there is
controversy about the precise nature of these diﬀerences. It is generally
agreed that mortality rates of blacks are higher than that of whites at all
ages below seventy-ﬁve, for both men and women. However, a number of
studies have reported that there exists a mortality “crossover” between
blacks and whites at older ages, meaning that black mortality rates fall
below those of whites at older ages (Sorlie et al. 1992). However, other au-
thors have concluded that the racial crossover does not exist but, rather,
is a result of “serious errors and inconsistencies in the data on which na-
tional estimates of African-American mortality at older ages are based”
(Preston et al. 1996). The ages reported on death certiﬁcates appear to be
systematically younger than those reported in the U.S. Census. As a result,
when researchers correct for this misreporting bias, the racial crossover in
mortality disappears. If the racial crossover exists before or shortly after
retirement, it is potentially important for understanding how blacks fare
relative to whites under alternative annuitization schemes. While resolving
this conﬂict is beyond the scope of this paper, I ﬁnd little evidence of racial
crossover in the data and therefore make no corrections in the analysis
that follows.
While research on the mortality experience of Hispanics is more limited,
available evidence suggests that U.S. Hispanics have lower mortality rates
than non-Hispanic whites, despite a greater proportion of Hispanics living
in poverty, lacking health insurance, and having more limited access to
health care (Sorlie et al. 1993). Hispanics tend to have lower rates of heart
disease, cancer, and pulmonary disease, although these diﬀerencesd on o t
seemt ob ee x plained by the major known risk factors for these diseases,
suggesting perhaps a genetic or biological explanation. However, there are
severalr easons to suspect that some of the observed diﬀerence is not real
but, rather, due to sampling bias. For example, if sampling techniques tend
to undersample less healthy Hispanics (e.g., migrant farm workers), this
would bias mortality rates down. In addition, studies like the National
Longitudinal Mortality Study (NLMS), which is used in this paper, obtain
mortality information by linking to the National Death Index (NDI). This
means that, because deaths outside of the United States are not recorded
in the NDI, some individuals’ deaths will therefore be missed. One re-
search has labeled this eﬀect the “Salmon bias,” due to the “compulsion
to die in one’s birthplace,” which leads to a bias in mortality rates (Pablos-
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Mendez 1994). In the NLMS data, I ﬁnd that mortality rates for Hispanic
women are, in fact, lower than those for white women at most ages. For
Hispanic men, the data indicate that mortality rates tend to be slightly
higher than for white men through the late forties and then fall below that
of white men until the late eighties.
It should also be noted that there is substantial heterogeneity within the
Hispanic population. Of particular importance is the fact that foreign-
born persons tend to have lower mortality risk than native-born persons
(Sorlie et al. 1993). Because a large fraction of the U.S. Hispanic popula-
tion is foreign born, this “healthy migrant eﬀect” may partially explain the
lower mortality rates among Hispanics. Projecting forward, if the native-
born segment of the U.S. Hispanic population increases as a share of the
total Hispanic population, these mortality diﬀerentials may decrease.
Economic Status
A third factor that is signiﬁcantly correlated with mortality is an individ-
ual’s economic status. The evidence suggests that individuals who are in a
higher socioeconomic group tend to live longer. There is, however, no de-
ﬁnitive way to measure these eﬀects. Three measures of economic status
areu sed in the literature, namely education, income, and wealth, and each
is subject to its own limitations.2
As i gniﬁcant negative correlation between education and mortality is
frequently found (Kitawaga and Hauser 1973; Deaton and Paxson 2001;
Lantz et al. 1998). This could be due to the fact that education serves as a
rough proxy for lifetime earnings, and hence reﬂects the fact that people
with more resources tend to live longer. On the other hand, there could be
av ery direct eﬀecto fe ducation on mortality if, for example, more highly
educated individuals better understand the risks of certain behaviors and
avoid them as a result. In this paper, I will use education as the only proxy
for lifetime resources. This choice is driven in part by a belief that educa-
tion is a better proxy for lifetime resources than other measures, and in
part by necessity—the NLMS income data are of questionable value, and
wealth data do not exist.
As econd widely used indicator of economic status is a measure of indi-
vidual or family current income. Again, a signiﬁcant negative correlation
between income and mortality is universally found (e.g., Kitawaga and
Hauser 1973; Hadley and Osei 1982; Lantz et al. 1998; Kaplan et al. 1996;
Deaton and Paxson 2001). In fact, many of these studies indicate that
income and education have independent eﬀects. However, current income
is a poor measure of lifetime resources for several reasons. The most im-
portant criticism of this approach is the problem of simultaneous causa-
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tion between income and health. Low-income individuals are more likely
to suﬀer from health problems and thus experience higher mortality rates.
However, it is also true that individuals in poor health may be unable to
earn a high income, in which case the causality of the relationship is
reversed. As a result, it is quite diﬃcult to provide any causal interpreta-
tion to the coeﬃcienti nas imple regression of mortality rates on current
income.
Athirdmeasureofeconomicstatusthatisusedintheliteratureiswealth.
Attanasio and Hoynes (2001), Menchik (1993), and Palmer (1989) all pro-
vide compelling evidence that wealth and mortality are inversely corre-
lated. The use of wealth partially addresses the simultaneity problem that
arises when using current income, since presumably wealth accumulation
is less aﬀected by health problems. However, as noted by Attanasio and
Hoynes (2001), wealth cannot be considered a purely exogenous variable,
both because of correlation with health, and because wealth accumulation
behavior of individuals with diﬀerent life expectancies could be diﬀerent.
10.1.2 Previous Literature on Social Security and Diﬀerential Mortality
Thei mportance of diﬀerential mortality has not gone unnoticed in the
economicsl i terature, especially with regard to its impact on Social Secu-
rity. It has long been recognized that high-income individuals might re-
ceive relatively higher beneﬁts relative to taxes paid than low-income indi-
viduals if they have a higher life expectancy. A spate of recent studies
(Liebman, chap. 1 in this volume; Gustman and Steinmeier 1999; Coro-
nado, Fullerton, and Glass, chap. 5 in this volume; Panis and Lillard 1996;
Duggan, Gillingham, and Greenlees 1995; Garrett 1995) have investigated
the progressivity of the existing Social Security beneﬁt system, making use
of mortality diﬀerences by economic factors. These authors agree that
there are signiﬁcant correlations between measures of economic well-being
and mortality. Several of these authors ﬁnd that the mortality diﬀerences,
when combined with other features of the U.S. Social Security beneﬁt
rules, are suﬃcientt oeliminate the progressivity of the current system on
a lifetime basis.
All of the aforementioned papers have focused primarily on the impact
of diﬀerential mortality on the existing Social Security system. However,
these have limited applicability in quantifying the distributional impact of
an individual accounts system. There are at least three distinct factors that
aﬀect the progressivity of the current system: a regressive payroll tax, a
progressive beneﬁt formula, and diﬀerential mortality.3 Many individual
account proposals do not involve progressive beneﬁt formulas, and so the
potentially regressive eﬀects of mandated annuitization may have a much
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more direct eﬀecti ns uchasystem.4 This paper, along with recent work by
Feldstein and Liebman (chap. 7 in this volume), is among the ﬁrst papers
to explore the implications of mortality diﬀerentials within the speciﬁc
context of an individual accounts system.
10.1.3 Estimates of Diﬀerential Mortality Using the
National Longitudinal Mortality Survey
Rather than piece together estimates of the impact of gender, race, and
economic status on mortality from several disparate sources, this paper
uses new estimates from the NLMS. The NLMS is a survey of individuals
whow ere originally included in the Current Population Survey and/or the
Census in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Throughout the 1980s, death
certiﬁcate information from the NDI was merged back into the survey
data, allowing researchers to compare the death rates of individuals on the
basiso fd e mographic characteristics at the time of the interview.
Age-speciﬁc mortality estimates from the NLMS are constructed based
on gender, race, ethnicity, and educational attainment.5 I ﬁrst construct
separate mortality rates for black, white, and Hispanic males and females,
at o tal of six groups. I then further diﬀerentiate whites and blacks into
three education groups, namely less than high school, high school plus up
to three years of college, and college graduates. Due to small sample sizes,
it is not possible to diﬀerentiate Hispanics along educational lines. While
the NLMS data do include a measure of family income in 1980, I do not
make use of this information, due to the problem of simultaneous cau-
sation.
Several steps are required in order to use the NLMS to construct com-
plete cohort mortality tables for speciﬁc groups. The ﬁrst step is to split
the NLMS sample into separate groups based on the gender, race, ethnic
and education categories. For each group g, the age-speciﬁc nonparamet-
ric (np) mortality rate, qnp
x,g,i sc alculated as the fraction of those individuals
age x who die before attaining age x  1. This procedure provides a simple,
nonparametric estimate of the age-speciﬁc mortality rate for individuals
with the characteristics of group g.
There are several reasons one does not want to stop here and simply use
these nonparametric estimates. First, sample sizes are quite small in some
groups (e.g., college-educated black men) at many ages, and therefore the
point estimates are noisy and even nonmonotonic with age, which is clearly
inconsistent with known actuarial experience. Second, even if the NLMS
data perfectly represented the population alive in 1980, this approach
would only provide a 1980 “period” mortality table, or the mortality expe-
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interest is a “cohort” mortality table that represents the mortality experi-
ence of individuals born in a particular year. The diﬀerence between these
two tables arises from the fact that mortality rates have historically im-
proved over time. Thus, some method of conversion from a 1980 period
table to a particular birth cohort table is required. Third, the NLMS study
is not fully representative of the entire U.S. population, in part because
it excludes the institutionalized population and thus understates overall
mortality rates. Therefore, although the NLMS may contain valuable in-
formation about the relative mortality rates of various groups, it is unlikely
to provide accurate information about the absolute levels of mortality for
the population as a whole.
In order to address these concerns, several additional steps are required.
In order to correct for nonmonotonicity, the nonparametric estimates,
qnp
x,g,a re treated as the independent variable in a nonlinear least squares
regression on age x.T he nonlinear regression is used to estimate three
parameters of a Gompertz-Makeham survival function. As explained in
Jordan (1991), with the proper choice of the three parameters, this formula
canb ea pplied from about age twenty almost to the end of life. The






















where x is age, and g, c,a n ds are the parameters to be estimated. Note that
if l0 is set equal to 1, then lx is simply the cumulative survival probability at
age x.U s i n gthe regression estimates of g, c,a n ds,o ne then has a “Ma-
keham formula” that gives mortality qx as a function of x. Let us denote
these ﬁtted values of mortality for group g at age x as qfit
x,g.A ni mportant
feature of this approach is that ﬁtted mortality rates are a monotonically
increasing function of age x.A nother feature is that it allows one to create
out-of-sample estimates of mortality. Therefore, although only data from
aget wenty-ﬁve to eighty-four are used to ﬁt the curve, the formula can
provide estimates of mortality for ages outside of this range.
Once these predicted mortality rates are in hand, the next step is to
convert them into cohort life tables for each group by making two related
assumptions. The ﬁrst is that the ratio of a group’s age-speciﬁc mortality
to that of the population as a whole (qx,g/qx)i nthe NLMS sample is an
accurate portrayal of these ratios in the full population in 1980. The second
assumption is that these ratios are constant over time. By invoking these
408 Jeﬀrey R.B r o w ntwo assumptions, it is possible to then construct a group-speciﬁc cohort
life table fora n yy e ar.
Speciﬁcally, let qfit
x,g bethe ﬁtted value of the mortality rate for an individ-
ual age x belonging to group g,a n dl e tqfit
x be the mortality rate for an
individual age x for the population as a whole, both from the ﬁtted NLMS
data. Let qSSA
x be the age-speciﬁc mortality rate from the 1978 birth cohort
table from the Social Security Administration,w hich represents individ-
uals turning age twenty-two in the year 2000. Then the cohort, group-












Theo ne exception to this methodology is that in the case of college-
and high school–educated black males and females, I assumed that the
mortality ratio between education groups was the same for blacks as for
whites.Ithen applied the white education ratio to the ﬁtted q’s forb lacks
in order to construct the estimates for higher-educated blacks, because the
sample sizes at many ages were too small for these black education groups
for the reliable construction of an independent estimate.
Table 10.1 reports how the age to which a twenty-two-year-old in the
year 2000 can expect to live varies by the gender, race, ethnicity, and edu-
cation as calculated using the above methods. The average twenty-two-
year-old male can expect to live to age 77.4, while the average twenty-two-
year-oldw o man can expect to live to age 83.4. However, these estimates
vary widely by race. White, black, and Hispanic twenty-two-year-old
males have life expectancies of 78.3, 71.8, and 77.7 years respectively, and
white, black and Hispanic females have life expectancies of 84.0, 80.0, and
85.2 years respectively.
Life expectancy conditional on reaching age twenty-two also varies sub-
stantially by education level. Twenty-two-year-old white men with less
than a high school education can expect to live to age 75.3, a full 5.2 years
less than that of a white male with a college degree. Low-educated black
males have by far the lowest conditional life expectancy of any group ex-
amined, at 68.1 years. The highest conditional life expectancy is college-
educated whitew omen,w ho can expect to live to age 87.8.
Twop artially oﬀsetting limitations of these mortality diﬀerentials
should be noted. First, using education as a proxy for lifetime earnings
may actually understate the extent to which mortality rates diﬀer across
socioeconomic groups. Deaton and Paxson (2001) suggest that, even after
controlling for education, income diﬀerentials may continue to have an
independent eﬀecto nm o rtality. Second, these results do not diﬀerentiate
based on disability status. Disabled individuals experience higher mortal-
ityr ates than the nondisabled. If the disabled population is insured by a
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States), then their higher disability rates should not be included when cal-
culating the intergroup transfers that result from the retirement portion of
an individual accounts program. If it were possible to condition mortality
on being nondisabled, the average mortality rates would decline for all
groups, but more so for those groups that have higher disability rates. The
net eﬀecto fthis change would likely be to reduce the amount of redistribu-
tion that occurs through a mandatory annuity program.
Because a life annuity is a ﬁnancial vehicle that pays income contingent
on the individual’s being alive, people with longer life expectancies gener-
ally expect to receive more annuity income than individuals with shorter
life expectancies. These diﬀerences suggest that demographic groups with
lower average life expectancies will fare poorly under an annuity rule that
mandates the use of a single annuity conversion factor, or a single price,
for all individuals of the same age. However, these diﬀerences can vary
substantially based on the speciﬁc form that the annuity takes. Therefore,
the next section discusses annuities in more detail.
10.2 The Accumulation Phase
In general, there are two phases to an individual accounts retirement
system. The “accumulation phase” corresponds to an individual’s working
life, when he or she is contributing a portion of earnings to an account
that is invested in a diversiﬁed portfolio of securities. Then, upon retire-
Table 10.1 Conditional Life Expectancy by Gender, Race, Hispanic Status,
and Education
At Age 22 At Age 67
Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All 77.4 83.4 83.5 87.2
All Whites 78.3 84.0 83.6 87.4
All Blacks 71.8 80.0 82.3 86.1
All Hispanics 77.7 85.2 84.8 88.3
Whites
College 80.5 85.1 84.4 87.8
HS 77.8 83.9 83.4 87.3
 HS 75.3 82.1 82.3 86.5
Blacks
College 75.7 81.9 83.4 86.8
HS 71.6 80.0 82.2 86.1
 HS 68.1 77.5 81.0 85.1
Source: Author’s calculations, as described in text.
Notes: “Conditional Life Expectancy” describes the age to which an individual may expect
to live, conditional on having attained age 22 or 67.
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ment, the individual stops contributing to the account and starts the “pay-
outp hase” in order to ﬁnance retirement consumption.6 The design of
each of these phases has potentially important distributional eﬀects. This
section discusses the issues involved in the accumulation phase of the ac-
count. Section 10.3 discusses payout options.
Thec entral question in the accumulation phase from a distributional
perspective is what happens to the balance of an individual account upon
the preretirement death of a worker. There are two options. First, the ac-
count may be considered part of the decedent’s estate and thus be made
available to the individual’s family or other beneﬁciaries. Second, the ac-
count could become the “property” of the Social Security system and re-
distributed to the remaining workers in the system. In this latter case, the
contributions made by early decedents are used to increase the rate of
return to other participants in the system.
Let qx represent the annual mortality rate for an individual of age x,a n d
let r be the rate of return on investments in an individual account. For
simplicity, let us assume that r is ﬁxed. Under the ﬁrst option, whereby the
account balance is bequeathable, the gross annual rate of return on the
account is simply 1  r for all participants. If an individual contributes $1
at the beginning of the year and survives, he will have 1  r dollars in his
account at the end of the year. If he dies, his estate will have a value of
1  r dollars at the end of the year. In the second case, in which the assets
of deceased participants are redistributed to remaining participants, the





















The (1 – qx) factor in the denominator is the amount by which the return
is increased to survivors. Thus, if the investment rate of return is 5 percent,
and 1 percent of the population dies during the year, the account balance
of survivors would increase by 6.06 percent in that year. Feldstein and
Ranguelova (chap. 9 in this volume) have shown that over the course of a
lifetime, the cumulative eﬀecto fallowing preretirement bequests as part
ofa“ P ersonal Security Accounts” system is to decrease the mean accumu-
lation of assets at retirement by 14 percent.
Therefore, the question of whether to allow bequests boils down to a
choice between providing wealth to estate beneﬁciaries or providing higher
rates of return to those who live a long time. In thinking about the relative
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importance of bequests across groups, one must consider two factors,
namely the relative size of accounts (the “income eﬀect”) and the probabil-
ityo fd ying before retirement age (the “mortality eﬀect”). Individuals with
large account accumulations and with a high probability of dying before
retirement will beneﬁt the most from the bequest option. However, these
two factors often work in diﬀerent directions: Individuals with larger ac-
count balances are likely to have lower mortality rates, due to the inverse
correlation between economic status and mortality.
In order to estimate the net eﬀecto fallowing bequests, I have con-
structed a measure of the expected discounted value of bequests for each of
the racial, ethnic, and education groups as follows: Suppose an “average”
maleentersthelaborforceatagetwenty-two,earningannualincomeI22.As-
sume that annual income increases each year at a real rate of 1 g,s othat





where a represents the individual’s age. Assume that  is the fraction of
income that is saved in an individual account each year, and that the ac-
count earns a real rate of interest r.I fqa represents the mortality rate at
age a,a n dPa represents the cumulative probability of surviving from age
twenty-two to age a, then the expectedp r esent discounted value (EPDV)
of future bequests is
































If we assume that , g,a n dr are the same for all groups, then diﬀerences in
theexpectedpresentdiscountedvalueofbequestswillarisefromdiﬀerences
in mortality rates (Paandqa)a n dd iﬀerences in the level of income (I22).
To parameterize the income eﬀect—that is, diﬀerences in I22—I use the
Social Security earnings records from the restricted data supplement to
the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). Speciﬁcally, I take the ratio of
the mean Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) for males in each
socioeconomic group to the mean AIME for all males (using HRS popula-
tion weights). These ratios are reported in column (1) of table 10.2. As
these results indicate, there are substantial diﬀerences in the level of in-
come earned by each group, with the average white male earning 6 percent
more, the average black male earning 30 percent less, and the average His-
panic male earning 28 percent less than the average for all three groups
combined.7 For purposes of calculations in table 10.2, I will assume that













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.these diﬀerences in AIME are indicative of a constant diﬀerence in annual
earnings throughout one’s working life. In other words, I use these ratios
to shift the entire income path up and down, and assume that the slope of
the income path [g in equations (4) and (5) above] is the same for all
groups.
Columns (2) through (6) of table 10.2 report the cumulative probability
of leaving a bequest at ages thirty, forty, ﬁfty, sixty, and sixty-seven. These
ﬁgures provide some insight into the “mortality eﬀect” on bequests,
namely that, holding account size equal, the expected value of bequests
will be higher for individuals with higher mortality rates. As these columns
indicate, there is substantial heterogeneity in the cumulative probabilities
at all ages.
Column (7) reports the EPDV of bequests using equation (5) above,
setting g  0.01, r  0.03, 0.06, and I22  $30,000. As can be seen,
the EPDV of bequests for each group lies in between $5,932 and $10,205.
These rather small expected present values mask that fact that, conditional
on dying and leaving a bequest, the average bequest size can be substan-
tial. For example, with a riskless real interest rate of only 3 percent, the
account balance of an “average” male would grow to over $200,000 before
retirement. Feldstein and Ranguelova (chap. 9, this volume) show that an
individual investing in a mixed portfolio of bonds and equities would have
an expected account size at retirement of nearly $500,000. However, when
these large bequests are discounted and multiplied by the relatively small
probability of dying at each age, the expected present value of the average
bequesti so nly $8,306.
The ﬁnal column of table 10.2 provides a simple metric by which to
compare the importance of bequests across groups, which is the ratio of
the expected discounted value of bequests for each group to that of the
average male. As a starting point for interpreting these results, let us begin
by comparing whites and blacks, without diﬀerentiating by educational
attainment. Looking at column (1), we again see that whites have higher
earnings than blacks, and therefore will (holding  and r equal) have
higher individual account balances to bequeath. However, the probability
of ab lack male’s dying and leaving a bequest is substantially higher than
that of a white male. The net eﬀecti sthat the expectedp r esent value of
bequests is approximately 4 percent higher for black men than white men
($8,504 versus $8,178).
Looking down the last column provides insight into which groups stand
to beneﬁt the most from bequests. Bequests are larger for lower education
groups for both blacks and whites. Black men with a high school education
or less, and white men with less than a highs c h ool education, have an
expected discounted value of bequest that is much higher than the average
for all men. This is driven primarily by high mortality rates among these
groups. Bequests are smallest relative to the average for white college-
414 Jeﬀrey R.B r o w neducated men and for Hispanics. White college-educated men have earn-
ings that are 11 percent higher than average but have a relatively low ex-
pected discounted value of bequests due to very low mortality rates. The
Hispanic result is driven largely by the fact that their earnings are quite
low, with an AIME ratio of only 0.714, and the fact that their mortality
rates are lower than for other groups with similarly low earnings, such as
low-educated blacks. On the whole, it appears that allowing preretirement
bequests is most beneﬁcial to lower socioeconomic groups. This is because
the mortality eﬀecti s, in most cases, more important than the relative in-
come eﬀect.
10.3 The Payout Phase
Assuming survival to retirement age, the individual then enters the pay-
outp hase, or decumulation phase, of the individual account. Perhaps the
single most important design decision that must be made at this point
is whether to require annuitization of the account balances at all. Then,
assuming that some level of annuitization is required, there are many addi-
tional choices that must be made. How will the annuities be priced? Will
the payout be ﬁxed in real terms or nominal terms, or will it vary with
someu n derlying portfolio? Will there be any provisions for bequests, such
as guarantee periods or refund options? Will the annuity be written to
cover one life or two? Will there be opportunities to take partial lump-sum
withdrawals or to delay annuitization? Each of these choices has diﬀerent
implications for how diﬀerent groups fare under the individual accounts
system. Therefore, it is important to examine each of these issues sepa-
rately.
10.3.1 To Annuitize or Not to Annuitize
The ﬁrst issue that must be addressed is whether or not the individual
accounts system mandates annuitization. If individuals are allowed to
freely access their account balances upon retirement, there would be no
implicit transfers across groups, because at retirement all individuals
would have access to their own contributions plus accumulated interest.
This approach would make the individual account little more than a tradi-
tional saving vehicle, albeit a required one.
One problem with this approach, of course, is that it fails to provide
individuals with any longevity insurance. As a result, individuals facing an
uncertain date of death would ﬁnd it diﬃcult to allocate wealth in a man-
ner that does not “waste” resources in the event of an early death without
placing the individual at risk of outliving their resources. The insurance
aspect of an annuity is potentially quite valuable. As shown by Brown,
Mitchell, and Poterba (2001), a sixty-ﬁve-year-old male life cycle consumer
with log utility and no bequest motive would ﬁnd the opportunity to par-
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scheme may be optimal.
9. In City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), it was ruled that section 703(a)(1)
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 barred requiring women to contribute more than men to
pensions to receive the same beneﬁts. Five years later, Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris,
463 U.S. 1073 (1983) held that the same law barred giving men a higher monthly beneﬁt
than women.
ticipate in an actuarially fair, real annuity market equivalent to a 50 per-
cent increase in nonannuitized wealth. While this measure probably over-
states the value of annuitization due to the omission of precautionary
saving motives, bequest motives, and pricing loads, it is nonetheless an
indication that the longevity insurance beneﬁts of annuities are quite valu-
able. Many proposals to reform the existing Social Security system, which
currently provides a real annuity to retirees, recognize that some form of
annuitization may be desirable for this reason.
If annuitization is deemed desirable, there are many reasons to consider
mandating a minimum level. These reasons include the possibility that
myopic consumers may fail to provide adequately for old-age consump-
tion,a sw ell as the possibility of actuarially unfair pricing that arises due
to adverse selection and/or the correlation between income and mortality.
In what follows, I proceed under the assumption that some level annuiti-
zation would be mandated in an individual accounts system, and focus
on the implication of using diﬀerent types of annuities. After reviewing
the distributional implications of various annuity mandates, I consider
whether partial or delayed annuitization can lessen the distributional
impact.
10.3.2 Pricing Assumptions
The initial working assumption in this paper is that the entity that pro-
vides the annuity, be it the government or a private insurance ﬁrm, pro-
vides a “single price, zero proﬁt” annuity to all individuals. “Single price”
means that all individuals of the same age face the same price for a given
stream of annuity income: That is, annuity prices are not diﬀerentiated on
the basis of individual or group characteristics.8 Prices would be permitted
to varyb ased on the age of annuitization only. This assumption is made
fort wo reasons. First, the existing OASI beneﬁt formula does not diﬀer
along any gender, race, or educational guidelines. Two same-age individu-
als with the same AIME who claim beneﬁts on the same day are entitled
to identical monthly payments, regardless of any socioeconomic or demo-
graphic diﬀerences. Second, permitting such diﬀerences in the United
States, particularly along racial lines, would likely be politically infeasible.
While the private individual annuity market in the United States is permit-
ted to use gender-speciﬁc pricing, job-based pension annuities are not per-
mitted to provide diﬀerent annuity prices based on sex.9
416 Jeﬀrey R.B r o w n10. Several chapters in Shoven (2000) explore the potential importance of administrative
costs in an individual accounts system. Samwick (1999) also provides an excellent discussion
of reasons why these issues may be of less concern in the context of U.S. Social Security
reform.
Thes econd assumption, that of “zero proﬁt,” simply means that the
annuities are priced so that the system breaks even over the whole popula-
tion. That is, the expectedp r esent discounted value of all future payouts
is equal to the total of the premiums paid. The implicit assumption is that
administrative costs of the program are zero. Another way of stating this
is that the system is actuarially fair for the population as a whole, although
notn ecessarily for any one individual. While this assumption is clearly
inaccurate, given the likely existence of some level of administrative costs,10
as long as these costs are apportioned as a ﬁxed percentage of the account
balance, this will reduce the money’s worth ratio for everyone by the same
amount. Therefore, the relative transfers that occur between groups would
be unaﬀected.
10.3.3 Measures of Distribution: The “Money’s Worth” Ratio
In order to evaluate the distributional consequences of a particular an-
nuity structure, it is necessary to choose a metric. There are at least three
measures of valuation thath ave been used in the literature on Social Secu-
rity and annuities. These are (a) a money’s worth ratio, (b) an internal rate
of return, and (c) a utility-based measure of annuity valuation. Each of
these measures provides a slightly diﬀerent way of comparing annuity op-
tions.
The money’s worth measure is deﬁned as the EPDV of the stream of
annuity payments, divided by the premium paid. Take the simple case of
an individual who pays an up-front single premium to purchase an imme-
diate life annuity that pays $A per month as long as the individual is alive.










r 1 1 () ,
where Pj is the probability of living to period j, r is the interest rate, and T
is the number of periods remaining to the end of the maximum possible
life span.
Thei n terpretation of the money’s worth ratio is quite simple. If the MW
is equal to 1, then the expected discounted value of the beneﬁt ﬂow is
exactly equal to the premium paid and can be said to be “actuarially fair”
for the individual. If the MW is less than 1, then the individual is expected
to receive lessb ack in payouts than he paid in the premium, and thus the
system is placing a negative expected transfer, or expected tax, on this
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given annuity ﬂow, there are special cases in which two individuals with diﬀerent survival
curves will have an equal EPDV. This requires a crossover in mortality rates (i.e., that one
person have higher mortality at one age) and lower mortality at a diﬀerent age. Similarly, it
is possible that, with a nonzero discount rate, an individual with a longer life expectancy
would nonetheless value an annuity less than an individual with a shorter life expectancy.
person. If the MW is greater than 1, then the individual is expected to
receive more in annuity payments than he or she paid into the system in
premiums, and is therefore receiving a positive expected transfer.
The ﬁrst thing to note about this setup is that as long as mortality risk
diﬀers across groups, providing life annuities under a single price con-
straint will generally lead to the MW measure’s diﬀering across individu-
als. That is, one can either have equal annuity payments per dollar pre-
mium for everyone, or one can have equal MWs for all individuals, but
generally not both.11 Only by completely eliminating the role of mortality
risk in the valuation of annuities can we make the diﬀerences in MW
across groups disappear.
Thes econd method of measuring diﬀerences in annuity value is to use
an internal rate of return, or IRR. This measure is really just a restatement
of the MW measure, since the internal rate of return is, by deﬁnition, the
value of r that makes MW in equation (6) equal to 1. Because the same
information is contained in the MW measure and the IRR measure, little
is gained by reporting both. Therefore, I will limit the results to the MW
measure.
Both the MW and the IRR measure are purely ﬁnancial measures that
do notc a pture the utility gains or losses associated with changes in a par-
ticular income stream. Risk-averse individuals will value the longevity in-
surance provided by annuities. For example, Mitchell et al. (1999) show
that the utility gains to single life-cycle individuals are large enough that
an annuity with a MW of only 0.80 might still be welfare enhancing.
In the context of measuring distributional impacts across demographic
groups, however, using ﬁnancial measures is a natural starting point. The
magnitude of the utility gain will be sensitive to the parameterization of
the utility function, and utility functions may diﬀer across the demo-
graphic groups being analyzed. For example, there is some evidence that
risk aversion may diﬀer between men and women (Eisenhower and Halek
1999). In addition, many annuity options involve payments to the estate
of an insured individual after death. In order to value these payments, it
would be necessary to have a precise way to parameterize the utility of
bequestf unction. There is remarkably little consensus in the literature
abouth ow to model bequest motives, and virtually no consensus about
the particular parameterization. Research by Bernheim (1991), Laitner
and Juster (1996), and Wilhelm (1996) all point to the existence of opera-
tive bequest motives, while Hurd (1987, 1989) and Brown (2001a, 2001b)
418 Jeﬀrey R.B r o w nﬁnd little evidence in support of such a view. For these reasons, I focus on
the ﬁnancial measure of money’s worth, keeping in mind that the utility
consequences of a particular policy may diﬀer from the distribution of
MWs. In particular, an individual may ﬁnd an annuity to be welfare en-
hancing even if its MW is less than 1. Extending this analysis to account
for the utility implications is left for future research.
10.3.4 Individual Annuities: Real and Nominal
I ﬁrst examine an annuity that closely mirrors the existing U.S. Social
Security system for a single individual—an immediate real annuity written
onas ingle life. With this form of annuity, individuals simply exchange
their accumulated assets to the annuity provider (i.e., the government or
the insurance company), and monthly payments to the individuals com-
mence immediately. The monthly payout is received until the individuals
die, at which time the annuity contract ends. If the nominal payments from
the annuity are indexed to the rate of inﬂation (as with the current OASI
system), then the real value of the annuity payments is constant for the
remainder of one’s life.
The monthly income that would derive from an actuarially fair real an-
nuityi se asily computed. Assuming that an individual converts $100,000
into such an annuity, the monthly annuity payment, A,t ow h i c hthe indi-












where r is the monthly real interest rate, Pj is the cumulative probability
of surviving from the date of purchase of the annuity to date j,a n dT is
the number of periods remaining until the individual reaches the assumed
maximum life span. If the annuity were ﬁxed in nominal dollars instead of
being indexed to inﬂation, the monthly real interest rate r would be re-
placed by the monthly nominal interest rate.
Due to the “single price” constraint, the value of A is constrained to be
the same for all individuals. This is accomplished by constructing Pj from
a dollar-weighted average mortality of all participants in the individual
accounts program. For purposes of this paper, the value of A is determined
with a unisex version of the 1978 birth cohort table from the 1999 Social
Security Administration Trustees’r eport. This represents the “average”
mortality of the entire population that turns age twenty-two in the year
2000, including men and women of all races and economic groups. Assum-
ing a 3 percent real interest rate, the value of A for a real single life annuity
foras ixty-seven-year-old individual is $621.25 per month.
It should be noted that this method of constructing the monthly payout
of an annuity may diﬀer from the value of A that would be required to
Diﬀerential Mortality, Individual Retirement Account Annuities 419make the system break even. This is because the unisex table is weighted
by the number of lives rather than the number of dollars in the accounts.
It is not clear in which direction this may bias the value of A,b e c ause
there are two oﬀsetting eﬀects. First, a unisex table places heavy weight
on female mortality, especially at older ages, when the number of women
in the population surpasses the number of men. If women, who have lower
mortality rates, tend to accumulate lower account balances due to lower
earnings and/or lower labor force participation, the use of a unisex table
will understate average mortality. The second eﬀecti sthat if individuals
with larger account balances live longer, then using people-weights instead
of dollar-weights will tend to overstate average mortality. Because these
two eﬀects worki no ﬀsetting directions, the net bias is unclear. Impor-
tantly, the eﬀecto fa ny such bias is to change the value of A for everyone,
so while the absolute level of the MW may change, the diﬀerence in MW
across groups will remain unaﬀected.
To compute the MW for each gender, race, and education group, the

























Note that if Pg,j from equation (8) equals Pj from equation (6) (i.e., group
mortality equals the mortality rates used in pricing the annuity), then the
annuity is priced in an actuarially fair manner for that group, and the MW
will equal 1.
Table 10.3 reports the MW values for the various demographic groups
under three diﬀerent assumptions. The ﬁrst two columns report the MW
fora ni ndividual real annuity when real rate of interest is 3 percent (col-
umn [1]) and 6 percent (column [2]). Column (3) reports the MW for a
nominal annuity when the real rate of interest and the rate of inﬂation are
both set equal to a ﬁxed 3 percent. Note that a “nominal” annuity with a
ﬁxed inﬂation rate corresponds to a declining real annuity.
The ﬁrst ﬁnding is that the use of a unisex pricing structure results in
large expected transfers from men to women. Focusing ﬁrst on the case of
ar e a la n n uity with a 3 percent interest rate, we can see that because female
mortality rates are lower than male mortality rates at all ages, the average
MW for men is 0.920 while the average for women is 1.076. This means
that the average male can expect to receive $0.92 in annuity income for
every dollar used to purchase the annuity, while the average woman can
expect to receive nearly $1.08 for every dollar contributed. In essence, this
pricing structure results in a transfer from men to women equal to approx-
imately 8 percent of the accumulated wealth. Importantly, one way to
420 Jeﬀrey R.B r o w n“correct” for this transfer across genders, at least for the case of married
individuals, is to require the purchase of a joint and survivor annuity,
which will be discussed below.
Looking within gender groups, we also see large diﬀerences in the MW
across racial or ethnic lines. Black men do particularly poorly under this
individual real annuity, having an MW of only 0.862. This means that the
average black male can expect to lose approximately 14 percent of his
account balance due to his higher mortality risk. White and Hispanic men,
on the other hand, have quite slightly more favorable MW ratios of 0.927
and 0.988 due to their low mortality rates. A similar pattern is found
among women, although in all cases the MW ratios are higher than for
men. Black women on average have an MW close to 1 (1.022), indicating
that the mortality advantage of being female is largely oﬀsetb ythe mortal-
Table 10.3 Money’s Worth of Real and Nominal Individual Annuities
Real Annuity Real Annuity Nominal Annuity
(r  0.03) (r  0.06) (r 0.03)
(1) (2) (3)
Men
All 0.920 0.937 0.938
All Whites 0.927 0.943 0.944
All Blacks 0.862 0.885 0.886
All Hispanics 0.988 0.998 0.998
Whites
College 0.967 0.979 0.980
HS 0.916 0.933 0.934
 HS 0.865 0.888 0.889
Blacks
College 0.916 0.935 0.935
HS 0.857 0.880 0.881
 HS 0.800 0.829 0.830
Women
All 1.076 1.060 1.059
All Whites 1.084 1.067 1.067
All Blacks 1.022 1.011 1.011
All Hispanics 1.123 1.097 1.097
Whites
College 1.106 1.086 1.086
HS 1.080 1.063 1.063
 HS 1.044 1.031 1.031
Blacks
College 1.055 1.041 1.041
HS 1.022 1.012 1.011
 HS 0.976 0.970 0.970
Source: Author’s calculations, as described in text.
Diﬀerential Mortality, Individual Retirement Account Annuities 421ity disadvantage of being black. White women have an MW of 1.084, while
Hispanic women have a very high MW of 1.123. Thus, just as black men
area ta14 percent disadvantage, Hispanic women are at a 12 percent ad-
vantagew hen an individual real annuity is used.
Further segmenting the population by educational attainment shows
evenf urther diversity in the MW calculations. Across all racial and gender
lines, there is a monotonic positive relationship between the level of educa-
tion and the MW. Having at least a college education raises the MW to
0.967 for white men. It is also clear that low-educated black males are the
most disadvantaged group, due to their poor mortality prospects. They
cane xpectt or eceive only $0.80 on the dollar that is annuitized in a real
annuity. The biggest “winners” are well-educated white women and His-
panic women, who have MW ratios of 1.106 and 1.123, respectively.
Then ext column in table 10.3 shows how the results for a real annuity
diﬀer if the interest rate is 6 percent instead of 3 percent. The central result
is that a higher interest rate reduces the dispersion in MW ratios, raising
the MW for groups with a low MW and lowering the MW for groups with
ah i gher MW, although the reduction in dispersion is small. Increasing the
interest rate from 3 percent to 6 percent increases the monthly payment
from $621.25 to $805.14. In this case, individuals who die early will have
already received a higher income in the early periods. Long-lived individu-
als also receive the higher beneﬁt, and for longer, but these later payments
areb eing discounted at a higher rate.
Column (3) of table 10.3 reports the MW results for a nominal annuity.
Nominal annuities may be less attractive than inﬂation-indexed annuities,
since the latter oﬀer the advantage of providing a constant real consump-
tion stream. Previous work by Brown, Mitchell, and Poterba (2001) indi-
cates that real annuities oﬀer utility gains in excess of those provided by
annuities that are ﬁxed in nominal terms, particularly in a world with un-
certain inﬂation. However, the initial annuity payment is lower for real
annuities. For example, if there were a constant inﬂation rate of 3 percent
annually, the real annuity would have an initial payment of $621.25 per
month, while the nominal annuity would have an initial payment of
$808.86 per month. Due to inﬂation, however, the real value of the nomi-
nal annuity would decline over time at a rate of 3 percent per annum.
Thus, the real value of a nominal annuity is “front loaded.” For individuals
facing higher-than-average mortality risk, front-loading annuities will in-
crease their MW, since they are relatively more likely to be alive to receive
these larger early payments.
Not surprisingly, the use of a nominal annuity has a similar eﬀect toa n
increase in the real interest rate: Namely, it decreases the degree of disper-
sion in MW. This is simply because the shorter duration of the nominal
annuity helps those with high mortality risk and hurts those with low mor-
tality risk. Using a nominal annuity in a world with a ﬁxed inﬂation rate
422 Jeﬀrey R.B r o w nof3percent reduces the largest negative transfer (from low-educated black
men) to 17 percent of the account balance, as compared to 20 percent
forareal annuity. It is again important to stress, however, that although
providing a nominal annuity has the possibly beneﬁcial eﬀect of compress-
ing the dispersion in MW ratios, it is possible that all groups could be made
worse oﬀ by this choice. In a utility-maximizing framework, the beneﬁt of
nominal annuities to high–mortality risk individuals could be completely
oﬀsetb ythe loss in utility from being subjected to an uncertain income
stream.
It is important to recognize that the results so far may represent the
worst-case scenario from a distributional perspective. This is because the
use of survivor and bequest options can improve the MW for individuals
whov alue money left to beneﬁciaries. It is to these types of policies that I
now turn.
10.3.5 Period-Certain Options
Continuing to operate within the realm of single life annuities, there are
severalo ptions available that can help to increase the MW for individuals
who face poor mortality prospects. A period-certain option speciﬁes a
minimum number of years that the annuity payout will be made, regardless
of the survival of the insured. Then, at the end of the guarantee period,
the contract reverts to a straight life annuity, and payments continue if
and only if the insured individual is alive. In the current market for single
premium immediate annuities in the United States, insurance companies
are willing to oﬀer certainty periods of nearly any length, although ten
and twenty years are most common.
With a period-certain option, even if an individual faces a high proba-
bility of death early in the payout phase, the beneﬁciaries of the individu-
al’s estate will continue to beneﬁt from the annuity. The reason these op-
tionss erve to compress the distribution of MW ratios toward 1 is that they
lessen the importance of individual mortality risk in the MW calculation.
Period-certain options are quite common in private annuity markets in
the United States. According to the Life Insurance Market Research Asso-
ciation (LIMRA), if one looks at individually purchased (nongroup) ﬁxed
individual annuities sold in the United States, 73 percent of individual life
annuities and 64 percent of joint and survivor life annuities included a
period-certain option (LIMRA 1998). TIAA-CREF also reports that 74
percent of male annuitants choose a period-certain option on their annuity
(King 1996). It is unclear what motivates this choice. Bequests are cer-
tainly one reason, since it is the beneﬁciaries of the policy who stand to
gain from this policy. However, it seems unusual that an individual should
desire to leave a bequest only if he dies in the next ten years, but not
thereafter. One natural alternative would be to leave a portion of wealth
unannuitized and either gift it or bequeath it upon death. Discussions with
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are often used more to overcome superstition or some form of ex ante
regret that comes from the fear that one might turn over one’s money to
an insurance company and then die soon thereafter. A second alternative
forl eaving a bequest is for an individual to use a portion of the monthly
annuity payment to pay the premium on a life insurance contract, thus oﬀ-
setting a portion of any mandated annuitization (Bernheim 1991). In previ-
ous work, however, I have shown that elderly individuals do not appear
to use life insurance to oﬀset the annuity from the existing Social Security
system (Brown 2001a).
Thep ricing of a “life annuity with C year certain” is a straightforward
extension of equation (7) above. Again assuming a $100,000 initial pre-































The diﬀerence from the formula for a straight life annuity is that for the
ﬁrst C years, payments are made regardless of the individual’s survival.
Therefore, the Pj term is excluded from the pricing equation for the ﬁrst
12*C months.
Because the ﬁrst C years of payments are not life contingent, the amount
of the monthly payment APC is less than the monthly income that would
be received under a straight life annuity A.T able 10.4 shows the monthly
income that would be available to an individual who chooses a single life
annuity, a life annuity with ten-year certain, and a life annuity with a
twenty-year certain. Looking at the ﬁrst row, for real annuities, and again
using the assumption of a unisex population average mortality table and a
real interest rate of 3 percent, we see that the monthly incomes for a sixty-
seven-year-old annuitant are approximately $621, $586, and $503 respec-
tively.T hus,at e n-year period-certain option reduces the income available
to the insured by 6 percent, while a twenty-year option reduces monthly
income by 19 percent. For a nominal annuity, the nominal monthly in-
comes from these three options are approximately $809, $760, and $669.
Table 10.4 Initial Monthly Income from Annuities
Real Life Real Annuity Real Annuity
Annuity ($)  10 PC ($)  20 PC ($)
(1) (2) (3)
Real (r  0.03) 621.25 586.11 503.35
Nominal (r  0.03, 0.03) 808.86 759.92 669.29
Source: Author’s calculations, as described in text.
Note: PC  period certain (see text).
424 Jeﬀrey R.B r o w nThe fact that the survival probabilities for the ﬁrst C years are irrelevant
for the pricing of annuities with period-certain options means that mortal-
ity diﬀerentials across individuals are also irrelevant during the ﬁrst C
years. As a result, period-certain options oﬀer an eﬀective vehicle for
bringing the MW ratios of various groups closer to 1 if an individual values
beneﬁts to survivors as much as beneﬁts to himself. To think about the








































where  represents a measure of the value of a dollarl eft to beneﬁciaries
to the value of a dollar consumed by the individual purchasing the annuity.
If 1, we are back to purely a ﬁnancial calculation, and assuming that
a dollar to the insured individual’s estate is equivalent to a dollar to the
individual while alive. In this case, the individual fully values the ﬁrst C
years of payments, regardless of survival. If 1, then the individual
values a dollar to his estate less than a dollar while alive. In the extreme
case of 0, the individual does not value the period-certain beneﬁts at
all, and the formula collapses to equation (9). Now, however, because APC
is less than A when there is no period-certain beneﬁt, the MW will be
much lower.
Table 10.5 reports results for real annuities with period-certain options,
for the case of r  0.03. The ﬁrst column reports the MW for the real
individual life annuity ﬁrst reported in table 10.3. Columns (2) and (3)
report the MW for a real annuity with a ten-year period-certain feature,
under two diﬀerent assumptions about  (1 and 0). Columns (4) and (5)
report results for a real annuity with a twenty-year period-certain feature,
again for two values of .
Comparing columns (1) and (2), we see that if individuals fully value
income to beneﬁciaries (1), then the use of a ten-year period-certain
option reduces dispersion by pushing most of the MW measures toward
1. The overall eﬀecti sm odest, increasing the average male MW from
0.920 to 0.936 and decreasing the average female MW from 1.076 to 1.061.
Usually, however, the more a group’s mortality diﬀers from that of the
average, the greater the change in the MW as we move from straight life
to period-certain annuities. Considering the eﬀecto nthe “outliers,” we see
that the MW for low-educated black males increases by roughly 6 percent
of wealth, from 0.800 to 0.861, and that for highly educated white women
decreases from 1.106 to 1.080.
Column (3), however, shows that this reduction in the MW dispersion
is clearly dependent on the assumption that 1. If 0, so that indi-
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below the level of a real annuity for everyone, and the level of dispersion
is similar to the level in column (1). For example, the diﬀerence between
the highest MW (Hispanic women) and the lowest MW (black men less
than high school) is 0.323 for a life annuity and 0.306 for an annuity with
at e n-year period-certain option that has no value (0).
The ﬁnal two columns of table 10.5 show results for the case of a twenty-
year period-certain option. The eﬀecto nthe MW of a twenty-year period-
certain option is substantially greater than that of a ten-year, because mor-
tality is rising rapidly between ages seventy-seven and eighty-seven (the
second ten-year period for an individual annuitizing at age sixty-seven).
Table 10.5 Money’s Worth of Period Certain Annuity Products
RealAnnuity20PC RealAnnuity10PC
Real Life
Annuity 1 0 1 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Men
All 0.920 0.936 0.868 0.972 0.745
All Whites 0.927 0.940 0.874 0.973 0.751
All Blacks 0.862 0.900 0.813 0.964 0.698
All Hispanics 0.988 0.979 0.932 0.980 0.800
Whites
College 0.967 0.965 0.912 0.978 0.783
HS 0.916 0.934 0.864 0.973 0.742
 HS 0.865 0.900 0.816 0.964 0.701
Blacks
College 0.916 0.932 0.864 0.970 0.742
HS 0.857 0.897 0.808 0.964 0.694
 HS 0.800 0.861 0.754 0.955 0.648
Women
All 1.076 1.061 1.015 1.026 0.872
All Whites 1.084 1.066 1.023 1.027 0.879
All Blacks 1.022 1.025 0.964 1.018 0.828
All Hispanics 1.123 1.097 1.060 1.042 0.910
Whites
College 1.106 1.080 1.043 1.030 0.896
HS 1.080 1.063 1.019 1.027 0.875
 HS 1.044 1.040 0.985 1.022 0.846
Blacks
College 1.055 1.046 0.995 1.023 0.855
HS 1.022 1.025 0.964 1.018 0.828
 HS 0.976 0.996 0.920 1.011 0.790
Source: Author’s calculations, as described in text.
Notes:  represents the relative value of $1 in an estate relative to the value of $1 in income
to the insured individual. PC  period certain (see text).
426 Jeﬀrey R.B r o w nAssuming that survivor beneﬁts are valued fully, all of the MWs are now
much closer to 1. The largest negative transfer is now less than less than 5
percent, down from 20 percent with a straight life annuity. Thus, to the
extent that annuitants fully value beneﬁts to their beneﬁciaries, a twenty-
year period-certain option substantially reduces the degree of redistribu-
tion. Once again, however, if beneﬁts paid to beneﬁciaries are not fully
valued, individuals can be made substantially worse oﬀ.I nfact, with 
 0, every single MW ratio is less than 1. Even college-educated white
women have an MW of below 0.90. The reason is simple—a twenty-year
period-certain option reduces monthly income by 19 percent. This 19 per-
cent is a pure cost if the individual does not place any value on the beneﬁts
paid after death.
10.3.6 Refund Options
Annuity providers often provide “refund” options to annuitants as an
alternative to a period-certain feature. Although there are many possible
ways to structure a refund option, the most popular form in the U.S. mar-
ketf or immediate annuities is to oﬀer a money back guarantee. The annu-
ity company oﬀers to provide a monthly payment Ar for as long as the
individual lives. Upon death, the company agrees to return to the beneﬁ-
ciary the initial premium, minus any annuity payments made to date. For
example, suppose an individual purchases an annuity with a $100,000 pre-
mium and receives $500 per month in income from a refund annuity. After
ten years (120 months), the individual will have received $60,000 in (nomi-
nal) payments. If the insured dies at this point, his beneﬁciaries would
receive $40,000. Note that the amount guaranteed is the nominal value
of the original premium, and no consideration is given to issues of dis-
counting.
As econdp o pular refund option works in a similar manner. The diﬀer-
ence is that, instead of providing a lump-sum payoﬀ at death, it continues
to provide monthly payments Ar to the beneﬁciary until such time that the
nominal value of the premium has been paid out. In this case, the annuity
is little more than a C-year period-certain product in disguise, where the
guarantee period C is chosen so that Ar(12C)  Premium. For example,
with an interest rate of 3 percent and an inﬂation rate of 3 percent, an
installment refund annuity sold to a sixty-seven-year old is identical to a
life annuity with 11.4 year period certain. Calculations of the MW ratios
for both of these options indicate that they lie between the rates for a
straight life annuity and a life annuity with a twenty-year period-certain
option, and so are not reported separately in the tables.
In theory, one could provide a refund option that ensures that the bene-
ﬁciaries receive a death beneﬁt that returns the full actuarial value of the
annuity upon the death of the beneﬁciary. In fact, such a “residual balance
annuity” is discussed in chapter 9 by Feldstein and Ranguelova for the
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would result by deﬁnition in a MW equal to 1 for everyone. However, this
product oﬀers no mortality premium, and in fact no insurance market is
evenr equired. Individuals can replicate this residual balance annuity by
amortizing the account balance in real terms over the maximum remaining
yearso flife. For perspective, while a real annuity with no period certain
oﬀers a real monthly payment of $621, amortizing the $100,000 until age
100 results in a monthly income of only $389, a 37 percent reduction. In
addition, this approach requires that the individual know the maximum
possible age with certainty. If there is any chance that the individual would
live past age 100, she would outlive her resources.
10.3.7 Joint and Survivor Annuities
According to the Census Bureau projections for the year 2000, 62.4 per-
cent of individuals aged sixty-ﬁve to seventy-four will be married with a
spouse present. Married individuals nearing retirement are concerned with
the consumption opportunities of both spouses, and therefore a single life
annuity may be inappropriate. Joint and survivor annuities, which provide
a stream of income as long as either spouse is alive, provide a spouse with
protection against a drop in living standard upon the death of the in-
sured individual.
Another reason for considering joint life annuities is that they provide a
mechanism for providing for nonworking spouses of insured individuals.
While the labor force participation of women has been steadily increasing
throughout the twentieth century, it is likely to continue to be the case that
large numbers of married individuals (primarily women) will accumulate
very little in an individual account. Mandating the use of joint and survi-
vor annuities for married couples is one way to ensure some level of income
for elderly widows.
As discussed in more detail in Brown and Poterba (2000), there are two
primary types of joint annuity contracts. The ﬁrst is a joint life annuity
with a last survivor payout rule. This rule speciﬁes a monthly payment
that will be paid as long as both members of the couple are still alive, and
also speciﬁes a fraction of this payment, , that will be paid to the survivor
after the death of one member of the couple. With the second type of
contract, often called a joint and contingent survivor annuity, one member
of the couple is speciﬁed as the primary annuitant. As long as the primary
annuitant is alive, the annuity payment is ﬁxed at A.H o w ever, upon the
death of the primary annuitant, the payment to the secondary annuitant
declines to a fraction  of the original payment. If, on the other hand, the
secondary annuitant dies ﬁrst, the payment to the primary annuitant does
not change.
This paper will restrict attention to joint and last survivor annuities,
whicht reat the spouses symmetrically. The pricing of a joint and survivor
428 Jeﬀrey R.B r o w n12. I have also calculated the MW ratios for J&S annuities under the assumption that they
arep riced using the unisex table for both spouses. The results are nearly identical, with the
MW calculated under these two methods never varying by more than 0.003.
(J & S) annuity is again a simple extension of the pricing of a single life an-
nuity.
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In pension plans and in the individual annuity market,  is usually set
equal to 0.5, 0.67, or 1.0, although insurance companies are generally will-
ing to provide annuities for any value of  between 0 and 1. When  takes
the value of 1.0, these products are often called “joint and full survivor”
annuities. In this case, the monthly annuity payment does not change upon
the death of the ﬁrst spouse. In order to compute the value of AJ&S above,
onem ust decide which values of Pm,j and Pf,j to use for pricing the annuity.
Rather than use a unisex table, in this case I choose to use average male
mortality rates to compute Pm,j and average female mortality rates to com-
pute Pf,j.12
To compute the MW for diﬀerent groups, it is now necessary to match
up characteristics of husbands and wives. With seven diﬀerent racial, eth-
nic, and education groups for each gender, this leads to forty-nine diﬀerent
possible “couples.” Rather than examine every combination, 1 present re-
sults for the case in which matching occurs within groups. Therefore, white
college-educated men are matched with white college-educated women.
Table 10.6 reports results for real annuities, both for a 50 percent survivor
beneﬁt (top panel) as well as for a full survivor beneﬁt (lower panel). In
column (1), I report results for a J&Sannuity with no period-certain
option.I nc o lumns (2) through (5), I report the MW forJ&Sa n n u i t i e s
with ten- and twenty-year period-certain options. In each of the period-
certain cases, I show results for 1( f ull valuation of beneﬁciary in-
come) and 0( zero valuation).
As the results indicate, the MW ratios are substantially closer to 1 than
in the case of individual annuities. For example, even in the case of the
lowest MW for a full survivor annuity, that of low-educated blacks, the
MW for a joint and full survivor annuity is 0.932. The highest couple MW
is 1.033, for Hispanic couples. While these implicit transfers are still large
in magnitude, they are much smaller than those for individuals alone, for
two reasons. First, even if two individuals with identical mortality pur-
chase a J & S annuity, the MW will be closer to 1. 0. This is because the
annuity will continue to pay out as long as either of the two individuals is
alive, and the probability that both individuals will die very early is less
than the probability that either one of them will. For example, even if two
individuals with the mortality characteristics of low-educated black males
Diﬀerential Mortality, Individual Retirement Account Annuities 429were to purchase a joint and full survivor annuity, the MW would be 0.843,
as opposed to an MW of 0.800 if each individual purchased a separate
single life annuity. The second reason, which has an even greater eﬀect on
the results, is that one of the primary sources of variation in mortality rates
is gender. Pooling together the mortality of a male and a female, and pric-
ing accordingly, largely removes this source of dispersion in the MW ratio.
Thus, even in the case of a couple consisting of a black male and a black
female, both with less than a high school education, the MW ratio is 0.932.
Thel ower panel of table 10.6 shows similar results for the case of a joint
and50percentsurvivorannuity.Comparingtheupperandlowerpanels,we
seethat higher survivor beneﬁts tend to reduce MW dispersion by more.
Table 10.6 Money’s Worth of Joint and Survivor Annuities
RealAnnuity20PC RealAnnuity10PC
Real Life
Annuity 1 0 1 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
100% Survivor Beneﬁts
All 1.000 1.000 0.994 1.000 0.944
All Whites 1.004 1.004 0.998 1.001 0.948
All Blacks 0.967 0.971 0.961 0.989 0.912
All Hispanics 1.036 1.033 1.029 1.016 0.976
Whites
College 1.019 1.016 1.012 1.005 0.961
HS 1.001 1.001 0.995 1.001 0.945
 HS 0.975 0.978 0.969 0.992 0.920
Blacks
College 0.991 0.992 0.985 0.996 0.935
HS 0.966 0.970 0.960 0.989 0.912
 HS 0.932 0.941 0.926 0.979 0.879
50% Survivor Beneﬁts
All 1.000 1.000 0.943 1.000 0.809
All Whites 1.008 1.008 0.950 1.001 0.815
All Blacks 0.944 0.964 0.890 0.992 0.764
All Hispanics 1.055 1.038 0.996 1.011 0.855
Whites
College 1.038 1.024 0.979 1.005 0.840
HS 1.000 1.000 0.943 1.001 0.809
 HS 0.956 0.971 0.902 0.993 0.774
Blacks
College 0.987 0.991 0.931 0.997 0.799
HS 0.941 0.963 0.888 0.992 0.762
 HS 0.889 0.930 0.839 0.984 0.720
Source: Author’s calculations, as described in text.
Note: PC  period certain (see text).
430 Jeﬀrey R.B r o w nTher e maining columns in table 10.6 report results of combining a real
J&Sannuity with a period-certain option. As with the case of individuals,
the inclusion of a period-certain option tends to decrease the dispersion
of MW ratios if the beneﬁts to beneﬁciaries are fully valued. In the case
of a joint and full survivor annuity with a twenty-year period certain, the
MW ratios are extremely close to 1. The largest negative transfer appears
to be from low-educated blacks, but it represents only a 2.1 percent reduc-
tion in wealth. The largest positive transfer is to Hispanic couples, who
receiveanet surplus of 1.5 percent.
It must again be noted, however, that providing a J & S annuity with a
twenty-year period-certain option has a cost. This cost is a decline in the
monthly income that is made available to individuals when they annuitize.
Fore xample, whereas a real single life annuity provides $623 per month
in income, a joint and full survivor annuity provides only $503 in income.
Adding a twenty-year certain option to this annuity reduces the beneﬁt
further to $474 per month. As a result of this nearly 6 percent reduction
in income from adding a twenty-year period-certain option to a joint and
survivor annuity, the MW of the twenty-year period-certain feature is sig-
niﬁcantly lower if the couple does not value income to beneﬁciaries (i.e.,
if 0).
10.3.8 Variable Annuity Issues
Up until this point, the annuities discussed in this paper have been ﬁxed
nominal or ﬁxed real annuities. The deﬁning feature of these annuities is
that, once the initial value of the annuity is determined, it remains constant
in nominal or real terms for the duration of the annuity contract (excepting
predetermined reductions upon one death inaJ&Sa n n u i ty). However,
many proposals for an individual accounts system, such as that outlined
by Feldstein, Ranguelova, and Samwick (2001), foresee a role for variable
annuity products.
Theg e neral conclusions of the distributional analysis conducted for
ﬁxed annuities carry over for variable annuity products as well. With vari-
able products, it will still be the case that, in expectation, resources are
transferred from high–mortality risk individuals to low–mortality risk in-
dividuals. It also remains true that the use of joint life annuities, period-
certain guarantees, and refunds reduces the extent of these transfers. How-
ever, there is one additional “choice variable” in constructing a variable
annuity payout stream that deserves attention here—the “assumed inter-
estr ate,”o rAIR.
As discussed in Bodie and Pesando (1983) and Brown, Mitchell, and
Poterba (2001), the amount of the initial variable annuity payment is a
function of the AIR. To determine the initial value A(0) of a single life
variable annuity, the insurance company solves an equation such as















where R is the AIR. The annuity-updating rule depends on the return of













R is the key parameter in designing a variable annuity. Assuming a high
value of R will enable the insurance company to oﬀer a large initial pre-
mium, but the stream of future payouts is less likely to increase, or more
likely to decline, as the assumed value of R rises.
For example, if R is set equal to the expected real return on the under-
lying portfolio, then the expected slope of the real consumption stream is
ﬂat. That is, if the portfolio return in each period was equal to its expecta-
tion, and thus equal to R, the real value of the annuity would be constant
in real terms. In periods when the portfolio’s real return fell short of its
expectation, the real value of the annuity payment would fall. Similarly,
when the portfolio outperformed expectations, the annuity value would
rise in real terms. If R is set equal to 0, the initial value of the annuity,
A(0) is relatively low, but the income stream will rise and fall in exact
proportion to the underlying portfolio. Therefore, the annuity payments
will, on average, increase in value at a rate equal to the expected return of
the underlying portfolio.
As was the case with ﬁxed annuities, front-loading annuities has the
eﬀecto flessening the size of the expected transfers, since high–mortality
risk individuals are more likely to receiveah i gher proportion of their pre-
mium back. Thus, setting a higher assumed interest rate will result in less
redistribution from high mortality rate groups to lower mortality groups.
This ﬁnding is directly analogous to the diﬀerence between real and nomi-
nal annuities discussed earlier—high–mortality risk individuals receive a
higher MW out of nominal annuities because the real value of these pay-
ments is higher in the early periods.
10.3.9 Delayed Annuitization
As reported by Finkelstein and Poterba (1999), pensions in the United
Kingdom since 1995 have oﬀered an “income withdrawal option.” This
option allows an individual to delay the purchase of an annuity until age
seventy-ﬁve, provided that he or she draws an income from the pension
fund in the meantime that is between 35 and 100 percent of the amount
that would otherwise be received from an annuity. If the pensioner dies
prior to annuitization, the assets in the fund become part of the individu-
al’s estate.
From an expected bequest point of view, this option beneﬁts the estate
432 Jeﬀrey R.B r o w nof individuals who have particularly high probabilities of dying between
the ages of sixty-seven and seventy-seven. Table 10.7 reports the ten-year
mortality probability of each group, conditional on reaching age sixty-
seven. As the table indicates, large disparities in mortality rates continue
at these older ages. Female mortality rates are still below those of men,
blacks have higher mortality rates than whites and Hispanics, and lower-
education groups have higher rates than high-education groups.
As with all bequest options, the diﬃculty with this approach is that it
must reduce the income available to annuitants. I have already shown that
as ixty-seven-year-old individual purchasing an annuity with $100,000
would be entitled to a monthly income of $621, assuming that annuities
were priced on a unisex basis. Imagine that, instead of purchasing an an-
nuitya ta ge sixty-seven, the individual instead consumed $621 per month
outo fthe individual account, and that the account continued to accrue
interest at a rate of 3 percent per annum. After ten years, the individual
would have an account balance of $47,759. If the individual annuitized
the account balance at this point, the annuity would provide monthly in-
come of approximately $419, or fully one-third less than the income that
would have been provided if an annuity had been purchased ten years
earlier. This is the fundamental trade-oﬀ:I fthe individual dies between
ages sixty-seven and seventy-seven, the heirs receive at least $47,759 dol-
lars, but if the individual survives, her income is 33 percent less for the
rest of her life.
Alternatively, consider what would happen if the individual did not an-
nuitize at all, but continued to consume $621 per month starting at age
sixty-seven. The individual account would be depleted after seventeen




All Whites 0.751 0.836
All Blacks 0.688 0.779








 HS 0.628 0.736
Source: Author’s calculations, as described in text.
Diﬀerential Mortality, Individual Retirement Account Annuities 433yearsa nd two months, or at age eighty-four. Approximately 44 percent of
all men and 61 percent of all women will still be alive at age eighty-four,
the point at which they would exhaust their resources if they tried to “self-
annuitize.” This is quite obviously not the optimal consumption path in
the absence of annuitization, but it illustrates the key point that delaying
annuitization comes at a cost of future consumption for longer-lived indi-
viduals.
10.3.10 Partial Annuitization Revisited
Now that we have discussed numerous annuity payout options in more
detail, it is instructive to revisit the issue of partial annuitization. All of
the transfers noted above occur as a result of mortality diﬀerentials across
groups. Any portion of an account that is not annuitized is therefore not
subject to these redistributive eﬀects. Put simply, if individuals are required
to annuitize exactly 50 percent of their account balances, then the amount
of redistribution would be cut in half, since the MW of the nonannuitized
portion is equal to 1.0.
One possible partial annuitization policy would be to require a mini-
muma mount of annuitization, where the minimum was chosen to be
above someb aseline level, such as the poverty line. In the United States,
it would be important to set the baseline above the level of any other gov-
ernment income guarantee program, such as Supplemental Security In-
come (SSI) in order to ensure that individuals did not rapidly spend down
their individual account assets and then become dependent on SSI.
Thep r imary disadvantage of allowing for partial lump-sum withdrawals
is that individuals lose part of the longevity insurance that an annuity is
meant to provide. The individual is still faced with the problem of de-
termining how to optimally allocate the nonannuitized wealth in the face
of an uncertain lifetime. If one of the reasons for requiring a forced retire-
ment saving program at all is that individuals are too myopic to save ade-
quately for old age, then this myopia may lead them to squander the lump-
sum portion of their savings in a suboptimal fashion.
Despite these disadvantages, allowing for some fraction of beneﬁts to be
left unannuitized has several potential beneﬁts. First, as we have seen, it
reduces the amount of redistribution in the annuity pricing system from
long-lived to short-lived individuals. Second, it loosens the liquidity con-
straint on the elderly that an annuity imposes, which can be beneﬁcial in
cases in which the elderly are hit with large unplanned expenditures, such
as unforeseen medical expenditures. Third, it provides individuals who
have bequest motives with a natural way to provide gifts and/or bequests
to their children that is not subject to the somewhat arbitrary timing con-
straints of the bequest that comes with period-certain or refund options
on an annuity. Finally, it should be noted that the utility gains that come
from annuitizing one’s resources are a decreasing function of the amount
434 Jeﬀrey R.B r o w nof wealth already annuitized. In other words, the ﬁrst dollar of annuitized
wealth has a much larger utility impact than the last dollar. Therefore,
annuitizing 50 percent of one’s wealth captures signiﬁcantly more than 50
percent of the utility gains from annuitization. Thus, the “cost” of the
lump-sum option may not be as great as it seems at ﬁrst glance.
TheU .K. retirement system has a “partial annuitization” option in its
personal pension schemes, as described in Finkelstein and Poterba (1999).
In these personal pension plans, individuals are permitted to take up to
25 percent of their fund (up to a maximum amount) as a lump sum at
retirement. It is important that this lump-sum option is an option, not a
requirement, of the program. Allowing this as an option rather than as a
requirement has two partially oﬀsetting eﬀects from a distributional per-
spective. If it is primarily lower socioeconomic groups (with higher mortal-
ityr ates) that choose the lump-sum option, this places more resources into
their hands prior to death, presumably making them better oﬀ.H o w ever,
this selection process will also have the eﬀecto fmaking annuities more
expensive, since the dollar-weighted mortality rates of the annuitized pool
would be improved. This would reduce the MW of annuities to all partici-
pants, including those in the least well-oﬀ groups.
10.4 Alternative Pricing Assumptions
Nearly all of the numerical results of the last section were driven entirely
be the “single price” assumption—the constraint that all individuals of
the same age would receive the same monthly annuity income per dollar
of premium paid, regardless of individual characteristics. This assumption
is certainly not the only assumption that can be made, although it is argu-
ably the most politically feasible. For example, private annuity markets in
the United States currently price annuities separately for men and women.
In addition, there is at least one U.S. company that oﬀers a “smokers pre-
ferred” annuity contract, which oﬀers higher monthly income for individu-
als who are smokers and thus have higher mortality risk.
It is in the interest of individuals who face high mortality risk to allow
the annuity provider to use as much information as possible to price annu-
ities. The reason is that a provider can oﬀer a much higher level of monthly
income to a high–mortality risk individual if it is allowed to base the price
on this higher risk level. This leads to some results that are quite counter to
our usual sense of political feasibility. For example, it would be very much
in the interest of black men with less than a high school education to allow
insurance companies to use race as a factor in the pricing of annuities.
Forp erspective, table 10.8 reports the monthly annuity payment that
would be oﬀered to individuals if annuity prices were set separately for
each demographic group and were priced in an actuarially fair manner for
each group. Recall that when individual real annuities were priced based
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premium bought an individual a stream of payments of approximately
$621 per month for a sixty-seven-year-old. Allowing for gender-speciﬁc
pricing only, men would receive $675 per month, while women would re-
ceive $577 per month.
Allowing pricing based on gender and race would result in white, black,
and Hispanic men receiving $670, $721, and $629 respectively per month.
White, black, and Hispanic women would receive $573, $608, and $553
respectively. Further diﬀerentiation by educational status results in an even
wider dispersion of monthly payments. Again looking at the extreme cases,
al o w-educated black male would receive $777 per month, fully $215 more
per month than a college-educated white woman.
It is also important to note, however, that group mortality rates are only
averages, and that there is a signiﬁcant degree of dispersion around this
average within each group. Thus, while it is true that college-educated
whitew omen on average live longer than black men with less than a high
school education, it is not true that this holds for every individual in each
group. Some white women will have mortality rates that more closely re-
semble that of black men, and vice versa. As a result, any pricing scheme
that seeks to address mortality heterogeneity by pricing based on group
characteristics will make some individuals even worse oﬀ.F o re xample, if
annuities are priced on a gender-speciﬁc basis, this will be especially
harmful to women who have mortality rates that resemble those of men.
Of course, it is now conceivable to think that, given the rapid rise in
medical technology, companies in the future will be able to determine
individual-speciﬁc mortality rates with a fairly high degree of precision.
Table 10.8 Monthly Income from $100,000 Policy if Price is Based on
Group-Speciﬁc Mortality
Men ($) Women ($)
(1) (2)
All 675.36 577.36
All Whites 670.42 572.90
All Blacks 720.83 608.15








 HS 776.92 636.84
Source: Author’s calculations, as described in text.
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use data from DNA tests to make insurance decisions. Unlike markets for
health insurance and life insurance, in which unhealthy individuals would
prefer that the insurance company not be permitted to use this informa-
tion,i nannuity markets the preferences are reversed. Individuals who can
beidentiﬁed as having a higher risk of dying should welcome the use of this
information in the pricing of annuities, as it would lead to a higher beneﬁt.
10.5 Summary and Future Directions
This paper has measured the magnitude of the expected transfers that
would result under various annuity options in an individual accounts sys-
tem. These expected transfers arise because mortality is signiﬁcantly corre-
lated with socioeconomic factors such as gender, race, and level of educa-
tion.T hese transfers appear to be economically important in both the
accumulation phase of the individual accounts and in the payout phase.
Allowing for preretirement bequests from individual accounts is rela-
tively more important to groups with high mortality rates at younger ages.
Fore xample, estimates from this paper suggest that 41.2 percent of
twenty-two-year-old black males with less than a high school education
in the year 2000 will not survive to age sixty-seven. While these high–
mortality rate groups tend to have below-average lifetime earnings, the
net eﬀecta ppears to be that these low-income groups tend to have higher
expected bequests than do higher-income groups. Thus, allowing preretire-
ment bequests may be an important element in reducing the extent of re-
gressive redistribution.
During the payout phase of the annuity, mortality diﬀerences are also
quitei mportant. Assuming that the political system constrains annuity
prices to be blind to socioeconomic mortality diﬀerences, the MW of re-
tirement annuities can vary greatly across groups. The MW is lower for
men than for women and for blacks than for whites, and increases in an
individual’s education level. For some annuity design options, such as an
individual real life annuity, these transfers can be as large as 20 percent of
wealth. Importantly, these expected transfers are generally regressive, in
the sense that they are going from the economically worse-oﬀ individuals
to better-oﬀ individuals.
The degree of dispersion in the MW ratios is very sensitive to the precise
structure of the annuity program. Annuities that front load payments, or
provide continued payments to an individual’s estate after death, result in
much less redistribution. The use of joint life annuities rather than single
life annuities largely eliminates the transfers that occur across gender lines.
Theu se of a J&Sannuity with a twenty-year certain provision reduces
the largest negative transfer to only 2 percent of wealth.
All of the options that reduce the implicit transfers do so at the cost of
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example, moving from a real single life annuity with no bequest provision
toar eal joint and full survivor annuity with a twenty-year period-certain
feature would reduce the monthly income from the annuity by nearly 24
percent. If a goal of an individual account system is to ensure a level of
monthly income that is no lower than would be available under the current
OASI system, as suggested by Feldstein, Ranguelova, and Samwick
(2001), the use of a joint and full survivor annuity with a twenty-year cer-
tain option would require a 24 percent increase in the annual contribution
rate over the rate required with a single life annuity.
There are at least two potentially useful avenues for further research.
First, all of the above results are based upon purely ﬁnancial considera-
tions, namely the expected present value of payments received. Future
workc o uld focus on the eﬀect of diﬀerential mortality on the utility gains
associated with the longevity insurance component of annuities. Second,
it would be useful to disentangle the eﬀecto fdisability status on the mor-
tality diﬀerentials across socioeconomic lines. This would be especially
important if any future individual accounts system was to maintain a sepa-
rate disability insurance program.
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Comment Andrew A. Samwick
Ideally, all of the individuals covered by an insurance system would face
the same probability of experiencing loss. They could each be charged the
actuarially fair premium (based on that probability) and would then
choose to insure themselves against the full amount of the loss. In practice,
however, insurance systems cover individuals who face very diﬀerent prob-
abilities of experiencing the loss but who are nonetheless charged the same
premium. Under these circumstances, individuals who have below-average
probabilities of facing the loss may prefer incomplete insurance if insur-
ance is only available at a premium that reﬂects the average risk.
In the design of any social security system, the loss is the probability of
an individual living “too long,” and the insurance oﬀered is a real annuity
for the full amount of the individual’s beneﬁt entitlement. A real annuity
is the ideal payout method to transfer resources from short- to long-lived
members of a group with the same expected longevity. The key problem is
that it is well known that observable groups—distinguished by race, gen-
der, and income—also diﬀer in their average expected longevities. Annu-
ities consequently appear to redistribute resources from short- to long-
lived groups within the population. Depending on one’s views on social
welfare, this may or may not improve perceived equity within a society.
While the current paper discusses the implications of diﬀerential mortal-
ityf or a system of individual accounts, there is nothing about the con-
straint of using a single mortality table that is particular to individual ac-
440 Jeﬀrey R.B r o w ncounts. The current pay-as-you-go, deﬁned beneﬁt system also suﬀers from
the same unintended redistribution between observable groups. The chap-
ter’s results consequently apply more broadly than to the ongoing debate
of Social Security privatization. They are just as relevant to any fundamen-
tal discussion of how to improve the equity and eﬃciency of the current
system.
In that spirit, the chapter explores—without making the case for a pol-
icy change—the feasibility of oﬀering partial annuitization of social insur-
ance payouts. On the whole, the paper is thorough and clear, providing
several illustrative calculations of transfers between groups as well as esti-
mates of how those transfers might change under diﬀerent annuitization
schemes. I can oﬀer a few brief comments on both the research design and
its discussion.
Thek ey analytical point is that front-loading the payments from the
social insurance system to early ages after retirement lessens the scope for
unintended redistribution across observable groups. It does so, of course,
because it makes the total payments less sensitive to the beneﬁciary’s mor-
tality. The cost of avoiding unintended redistribution across observable
groups with diﬀerent mortality risks is therefore a reduction in intended
redistribution within groups with the same mortality risks.
The chapter provides three mechanisms to achieve front-loading relative
to ab aseline real annuity. One is to oﬀer nominal annuities rather than
real annuities. With a nominal annuity, the real value of the payments
decreases over time as the price level rises. If the concern in moving to a
system of individual accounts is that private annuities are typically not
protected against inﬂation, then the equity arguments inherent in diﬀeren-
tial mortality suggest that this is less of a concern than previously thought.
Another mechanism is to oﬀer period-certain annuities, in which pay-
ments are lower than a conventional annuity but are guaranteed for a mini-
mumn umber of years even if the annuitant dies. These products are sur-
prisingly popular in the private market; perhaps this would also be the
case in a social insurance system. A ﬁnal mechanism is to use a high rather
than a low assumed interest rate (AIR) in variable annuities.
It is well known that women have higher average survival probabilities
than do men—about six years at age twenty-two in table 10.1. Choosing
the individual as the unit of observation, this seems to imply that the use
of as ingle mortality table forces men to transfer resources to women.
Table 10.3 shows that for a real annuity with an interest rate of 3 percent,
men have an average money’s worth of 0.920, compared to 1.076 for
women. At the extremes, black men with less than a high school education
have a money’s worth that is 20 percent less than the population average,
and white women with a college degree have a money’s worth that is 10.6
percent more than the population average.
Them ost striking result in the chapter is the eﬀecto fc onsidering
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male and a female, the couple’s longevity is an average of male and female
longevities. This averaging reduces the diﬀerences across most groups in
the population. As shown in table 10.6, with 50 percent survivor beneﬁts,
these disparities are cut in half. White couples with a college education
have an average money’s worth of 1.038, and black couples with less than
ah ighs chool education have an average money’s worth of 0.889. These
discrepancies are cut nearly in half again with 100 percent survivor bene-
ﬁts. In eﬀect, those huge transfers that a typical man makes to a typical
woman are generally made to his wife. It is also worth noting that mortal-
ity diﬀerences across couples are maximized when couples include mem-
bers of the same race and education groups. To the extent that husbands
and wives have diﬀerent races or education levels, the remaining diﬀer-
encesi na verage mortality across couples will be less than what is sug-
gested in table 10.6. Considering couples rather than individuals goes a
long way toward smoothing out longevity diﬀerences across groups.
The chapter considers three groups across which unintended redistribu-
tion might occur—gender, race, and education—with education serving
as a proxy for permanent income. I do not understand why the ﬁrst two
arer elevant in policy discussions. If women tend to live longer than men,
then women have a greater need for “insurance against outliving their
means,” and that is why they appear to have a higher money’s worth than
do men. The same argument can be made in comparing racial groups. If
the goal is to redistribute based on longevity, then why do we care about
observable but, in most cases, immutable characteristics that are corre-
lated with longevity?
We might also not care about diﬀerences across income groups for the
same reason, except for two diﬀerences between income and race or gen-
der. The ﬁrst is that income is under the control of the individual, and a
low money’s worth can discourage a person from earning income in the
same way as any other redistributive tax. The second is that Social Securi-
ty’s tax and beneﬁt formulas are explicitly based on income and cannot be
based on race or gender. Presumably, the goal of policy makers is to make
sure that the system is ﬁnanced in a suﬃciently progressive manner. Per-
haps policy makers are unaware of the correlation between income and
longevity, and, if they were made aware, they would prefer a beneﬁt for-
mula that was more progressive on paper. It would be very interesting to
know how much more progressive the beneﬁt formula needs to be in order
to oﬀset the impact of the income-longevityc orrelation on the present
value of beneﬁts (based on any reasonable estimate of average income by
race,e ducation, and gender groups). For example, what beneﬁt formula
with diﬀerential mortality has the same degree of progressivity as the cur-
rent beneﬁt formula under the assumption of uniform mortality?
Ih avet wo main criticisms of the way the analysis is presented. The ﬁrst
442 Jeﬀrey R.B r o w nis that the chapter discusses only the variation in average longevity between
groups, to the complete exclusion of variation in longevity within groups.
There is no doubt that the diﬀerences across groups are statistically sig-
niﬁcant, but it is not clear that these groupings explain much of the total
variation in longevity. This is analogous to running a regression of longev-
ityo na ni ndicator forr ace and getting a very high t-statistic and a very
low R2.
Focusing on average diﬀerences across groups tends to suggest that all
members of a given group experience the average longevity of that group.
This need not be the case. It would be useful to know the probability that
individuals in each group have a money’s worth less than 1 in addition to
the average money’s worth for the group as a whole. If mortality diﬀerences
across groups do not account for a large proportion of total variation in
longevity, then these probabilities will cluster near 50 percent despite the
large average diﬀerences across groups. If the data used in this study do
notp ermit such calculations, then clearly the role of within-group hetero-
geneity in longevity is an important direction for future research.
My second criticism pertains to the discussion, although ultimately not
the use, of the money’s worth rather than an expected utility measure. Two
arguments are made for not relying on an expected utility calculation.
First, the magnitude of the gains depends on the utility function, and the
utility function diﬀers across groups. Second, some schemes (such as a
period-certain payout) might pay beneﬁciaries, rather than the annuitant,
and these payments may diﬀer in their utility from annuity payments.
However, neither of these problems is avoided by assuming U(W)  W
and that bequests have either no value or full value. Of course, the choice
of au t ility function involves a degree of arbitrariness, but what (apart
from transparency) justiﬁes the assumption of risk neutrality? The money’s
worth is a natural starting point, but the analysis should be expanded to
include reasonable choices for expected utility and the utility of bequests
and to use measures of equivalent variation as the metrics for comparison.
The analysis in the chapter suggests that equity arguments associated
with diﬀerential mortality across groups could rationalize incomplete an-
nuitization if it is constrained to be done with a single life table. There are
other factors that also make partial annuitization a more viable option
than is commonly appreciated. The ﬁrst is that there are diminishing re-
turns to annuitization. Once there is a basic beneﬁt that is guaranteed in
every period of life, then, at the margin, failing to annuitize additional
dollars reduces expected utility by very little. This is important because
the beneﬁts provided by Social Security are far more than are needed to
simply keep pensioners out of poverty. The second is that individuals who
have higher ex post longevity are, in the grand scheme of things, the lucky
ones.A nother year of life means another year of leisure. If the social wel-
fare function that aggregates individual utilities is concave in total lifetime
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results in little loss of social welfare.
There is a perception in policy circles that a move to individual accounts
would imply lower annuitization of retirement income, with some welfare
costs. This chapter provides important evidence and insights that suggest
that there may also be less desirable equity consequences of full annuitiza-
tion.T he presumed inability of a private annuity market to match the
annuity currently provided by the Social Security system is less of an im-
pediment to reform than is commonly believed. Further, although this
analysis is presented in the context of Social Security reform, it is clear
that the unintended redistribution across groups is relevant in any system
that uses a single life table in paying beneﬁts, especially a life table that is
invariant to lifetime income. This chapter’s analysis is therefore relevant
eveni fthe current pay-as-you-go system is not substantially reformed in
the coming years.
Discussion Summary
Martin Feldstein said it was important to recognize that even though the
discounted values of most bequests in this paper are between $6,200 and
$10,200, these numbers are consistent with bequests of $51,000 for a forty-
year-olda nd $193,000 for a ﬁfty-ﬁve-year-old. Furthermore, Feldstein
mentioned taxation of beneﬁts as a potential factor in the redistribution
between diﬀerent education groups. Jeﬀrey R. Brown said that his aim was
to examine a simple system in which a certain percentage of income is
placed in an account and at retirement the balance of the account is annui-
tized.I ti sc ertainly true that taxes on beneﬁts and subsidies for contri-
butions could oﬀset the mortality diﬀerences across diﬀerent groups. He
pointed out that if reducing the eﬀect ofd i ﬀerential mortality is an impor-
tant goal, then this paper describes the magnitude of the problem that
must be overcome by other features.
John B. Shoven believed that there is strong social interest in mandatory
annuitization. A large percentage of expenses at the end of life have an
ability-to-pay component such as Medicaid. Annuitized income is a better
approximation of lifetime resources, and annuitization alleviates the moral
hazard problem caused by depleting assets to purchase other goods while
using Medicaid to cover medical expenses.
The eﬀects of diﬀerential mortality are exacerbated by the correlation
between income and diﬀerential mortality. Jeﬀrey B. Liebman stated that
because people with higher incomes have longer life expectancies, the rate
that balances the system is closer to the actuarially fair rate for the wealthy.
He wondered whether the calculations in this paper take this factor into
444 Jeﬀrey R.B r o w naccount and how much accounting for this would increase the diﬀerence
between groups in the results.
Angus Deaton wasc oncerned about the quality of the estimated mortal-
ityr ates.M o rtality experience has changed signiﬁcantly since 1980; for
example, the mortality for young white males has risen dramatically.
Moreover, the results may be biased because part of the eﬀect of socioeco-
nomic status on mortality is caused by voluntary lifestyle choices such as
smoking, drinking, and regular exercise. While the National Longitudinal
Mortality Survey income measure is not ideal, it does have predictive
power conditional on education. Consequently, the eﬀect of lifetime in-
come on mortality is underestimated. The author was open to any sugges-
tionsf or eliminating these problems and acknowledged that mortality ex-
periences change signiﬁcantly over time. However, the absence of data
capableo faddressing these issues seems to be a major stumbling block.
PeterO r szag felt that the interpretation of the results for Hispanics
is ambiguous. He noted that Jeﬀrey Liebman had said that there were
important diﬀerences between the mortality experiences of foreign-born
and U.S.-born Hispanics. To the extent that foreign-born Hispanics have
longer life expectancies and are also less likely to be covered by the Social
Security system, the interpretation of the results for Hispanics is unclear.
Courtney Coile suggested one possible remedy for groups hurt by man-
datory annuitization. Oﬀering people diﬀerent annuity options might al-
low people to undo the transfers between groups that may be undesirable.
While choice is a possibility, the author thought choice would lead to ad-
verse selection within the system. For example, if individuals expect to
die early, they might choose a period-certain annuity instead of a straight
life annuity.
Steven C.G oss mentioned the relationship between disability and mor-
tality as an important factor in the analysis. In studies that focus only on
retirement beneﬁts, it is important to use mortality estimates that exclude
the disabled from the analysis. This should reduce the dispersion be-
tween groups.
Stephen Zeldes questioned the measure of redistribution between
groups, positing one group that lives ten years and another group that lives
fort wentyy ears. If both groups have equal consumption in each year, then
there will be redistribution from group 1 to group 2. However, neutral
distribution would imply that the ﬁrst group’s consumption level would be
approximately half the second group’s consumption level. The author said
that there were two ways to approach this: either to equate expected values
or to equate incomes. He noted that if the correct measure of income redis-
tribution is conditional on being alive, then the conclusions will be very
diﬀerent.
Eytan Sheshinski indicated that this problem is essentially the standard
trade-oﬀ between ex post and ex ante eﬃciency. Using one annuity table
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pooling provides valuable ex ante insurance across risk classes. If everyone
cano nly purchase one annuity, the fraction of wealth that a person will
want to annuitize depends on the price of the annuity and the risk class of
the individual.
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